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Why do we observe a U-shaped industrial concentration curve over an economy's 
development path? We show that at least one third of this phenomenon is explained by the 











Pourquoi est-il observé que la concentration industrielle diminue puis augmente au cours du 
processus de développement d'un pays? Nous montrons qu'au moins un tiers de ce phénomène 
est expliqué par les effets de l'accumulation du capital. 
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Abstract
Recent research has documented a U-shaped industrial concentration curve over an
economy's development path. How far can neoclassical trade theory take us in explaining
this pattern? Building on Schott (2003), we estimate the production side of the Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model with industry data on 50 developed and developing countries covering
the period 1975-1995. We allow for multiple cones of specialization, and give special
attention to intra-industry factor heterogeneity and to the potentially indeterminate na-
ture of production. For each year, goods are grouped in one of two HO aggregates: an
aggregate of labor-intensive goods, and an aggregate of capital-intensive goods. Decom-
posing changes in industrial concentration over time, we show that at least a third of these
changes is explained by the diversi¯cation or concentration patterns at the HO-aggregate
level. As the relative price of the two aggregates is fairly stable over time, the mechanism
is the one of the textbook Rybczynski e®ect: poor countries accumulating capital have
diversi¯ed their industrial production by producing more of the capital-intensive goods,
while rich countries accumulating capital have made their production more concentrated
by specializing in the production of the capital-intensive goods.
JEL Codes: F11; O40
Keywords: Economic Growth and International Trade; Heckscher-Ohlin; Multiple
Cones; Diversi¯cation; Specialization; Industrial Concentration; Structural Change
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Recent work shows that countries grow through two stages of industrial development. In the
¯rst stage of development, as a country's per capita income increases, the country's manufac-
turing sector becomes more diversi¯ed. In a second stage, while per capita income keeps rising,
the country's industry becomes more concentrated (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2001). This phenom-
enon has major macroeconomic consequences. For instance, Koren and Tenreyro (2006) show
that industrial concentration (inversely related to industrial diversi¯cation) is important in ex-
plaining the volatility of the growth of GDP per capita. In the beginning of their ¯rst stage
of development, poor countries have a more concentrated industry, which contributes to the
higher volatility of GDP in these countries. Understanding why these two stages of development
are observed is therefore crucial to the design of economic policies aimed at reducing income
°uctuations in less developed economies.
This paper uses the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade as a framework to
study the evolution of industrial concentration over time. The initial idea is that the U-shaped
curve might be explained as resulting directly from the Rybczynski e®ect. In the textbook 2£2
HO model with a labor-intensive good and a capital-intensive good, when a country is below
or at the lower edge of the cone of diversi¯cation, he produces none of the capital-intensive
good and specializes in the production of the labor-intensive good. If the relative price of
the two goods does not change and technological progress is unbiased, capital accumulation in
this country should lead to an increased production of the capital-intensive good: this is the
well-known Rybczynski e®ect. For a relatively small capital accumulation, this leads to a more
diversi¯ed industrial structure: this is the ¯rst stage of development. But if the country keeps
accumulating capital and reaches or goes beyond the upper edge of the cone of diversi¯cation,
its manufacturing sector will be fully specialized in the capital-intensive good: this is the second
stage of development. Using data on 51 developed and developing countries over the 1975-1995
period, we aim at quantifying the importance of factor accumulation in explaining structural
change within the industrial sector.
Our results show that factor accumulation seems to explain an important fraction of the
observed variation in industrial concentration. But data analysis also tells us that other forces,
depending on the period under consideration, reinforced or counterbalanced the Rybczynski
e®ect. As can be seen in the HO model, the production of the capital-intensive good goes up
when its relative price also increases, and when technological progress is biased towards that
type of good. These two forces cannot be empirically distinguished in our work, but we show
that they were at play, jointly or not, during the 1975-1985 period. And, as they both lead to
a higher production of the capital-intensive goods, they reinforced the Rybczynski e®ect. On
the contrary, the Rybczynski e®ect was partially mitigated by an overall decrease in the price
of capital-intensive goods during the 1985-1995 period. Nevertheless, the overall price e®ects
appear minor in the whole story: capital accumulation is key.
Our results make sense only if production patterns are consistent with the HO model. That
1is con¯rmed in the ¯rst part of the paper. Using industry-level data for the 51 countries, we
provide strong evidence that the production patterns observed during the 1975{1995 period
are consistent with the production side of the 2 £ 2 HO model. The two factors we consider
are labor and physical capital, measured in e®ective units. The two goods correspond to two
\HO aggregates", which we construct following Schott (2003): one aggregate of labor-intensive
industries and another aggregate of capital-intensive industries. By doing so, we reduce the
number of goods, and we also obtain sets of underlying industries with similar capital intensities,
and thereby get closer to the theoretical HO model. In addition, this aggregation helps us
solving the problem of production indeterminacy that appears in HO models with more goods
than factors.1 We allow countries to belong to one of three cones: the cone of diversi¯cation
in which countries produce both aggregates, and two cones of specialization in which countries
produce only one of the two aggregates. As will be clear later, we not only use Schott's (2003)
empirical technique, but also build on it to get closer to the textbook HO model.
In the second part of the paper, we measure the contribution of the neoclassical factors
(Rybczynski e®ect, change in the relative price of the two HO aggregates, biased technological
change) to the evolution of industrial concentration.2 Koren and Tenreyro (2006) show that,
when one is interested in the volatility of growth rates, an appropriate measure of concentration
is the Her¯ndahl index. This is the measure of concentration we focus on. We introduce a
decomposition of its change over time in two components: a between-aggregate change and
a within-aggregate change. The between-aggregate change is positive when the shares of the
aggregates become more unequal, and negative when the opposite occurs. So, for instance, when
a relatively poor country starts accumulating capital and enters the cone of diversi¯cation, the
Rybczynski e®ect implies that the share of the capital-intensive aggregate should go up. This
makes the aggregates shares more equal and, because the country starts producing capital-
intensive goods, this should reduce industrial concentration. On the contrary, the within-
aggregate change is positive when each HO aggregate becomes more concentrated, something
a priori unrelated to the neoclassical factors mentioned above. As a result, our decomposition
enables us to isolate the contribution of the neoclassical factors to the evolution of industrial
concentration: it is measured by the between-aggregate change. The within-e®ect change is
intended to measure the e®ect of the non-neoclassical factors. Note that this decomposition is
especially relevant when there is production indeterminacy at the HO-aggregate level, as it is
likely to be the case in reality. Using this decomposition of the change in the Her¯ndahl index
over time, we ¯nd that neoclassical factors have contributed signi¯cantly to the evolution of
1See Melvin (1968). As discussed later, Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) ¯nd evidence of production inde-
terminacy at the industry level. The results in Schott (2003) can also be interpreted as a con¯rmation of this
indeterminacy.
2Our thesis is that capital accumulation, through the Rybczynski e®ect, is a major explanation for the two
stages of development. To distinguish the Rybczynski e®ect from the price e®ect, we shall focus on the average
price of the labor-intensive goods relative to the average price of the capital-intensive goods. In this paper, a
change in relative prices will always refer to this price ratio. We do not discuss price changes of any particular
good within an HO aggregate.
2industrial concentration. Our most conservative estimate indicates that, on average, at least
30% of the evolution in industrial concentration can be explained by these e®ects. We show
that capital accumulation has been the main force driving the phenomenon
Quite surprisingly for us the existing literature on the stages of diversi¯cation, most notably
Imbs and Wacziarg (2001) and Koren and Tenreyro (2006), has not put forward the neoclas-
sical factors (and especially capital accumulation) as a source of explanation for the U-shaped
industrial concentration curve. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work that
directly tests this hypothesis. Imbs and Wacziarg (2001) discuss two reasons that might ex-
plain the ¯rst stage of development. First, with non-homothetic preferences, the consumption
and production patterns change with real income, and it is generally observed that consumers
diversify their consumption as their income grows. The role of demand is likely to be important
in our paper too: while the relative supply of capital-intensive goods went up over time, it is
likely that a rise in demand helped to sustain the relative price of these goods. But demand is
not the main force. Second, as modelled by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), when risk-averse
agents can invest in imperfectly correlated projects and when investing in a project requires a
minimal investment, sectoral diversi¯cation will improve with the aggregate stock of capital and
income. This will allow investment in risky, but high-return projects. The present paper also
studies the relationship between the national stock of capital and sectoral diversi¯cation. But
di®erences arise: the emphasized mechanism is not the same; the exact relationship is between
the stock of capital per worker and industrial concentration, rather than between the stock of
capital only and industrial concentration; the relationship is nonmonotonic.
Imbs and Wacziarg also discuss three reasons that might lead to the specialization observed
in the second stage. They suggest that falling transportation costs (related in some way to
income) allow countries to specialize according to their comparative advantages, as predicted
by Ricardian models with a continuum of goods.3 Falling transportation costs might also lead
to the clustering of economic activity in speci¯c regions or countries. Finally, Saint-Paul (1992)
models a situation in which countries facing incomplete markets diversify their output in order
to reduce the volatility of their income. Financial market deepening reduces the incentive for
industrial diversi¯cation, and leads to industrial concentration.
These ¯ve forces are likely to be at play simultaneously, but we should have a diversi¯cation
phenomenon when the ¯rst two forces dominate, and specialization when the last three prevail.
In contrast, with the Rybczynski e®ect, we present a single explanation for the two stages of
development: rapid capital accumulation might explain the diversi¯cation of industrial output,
and the same capital accumulation might also drive the specialization phenomenon. Obviously,
all explanations are likely to have an impact on the evolution of industrial concentration. It is
therefore essential to measure the contribution of the Rybczynski and other neoclassical e®ects
emphasized in this paper. Our methodology is a ¯rst attempt to address this issue.
3The same result obtains in HO models with a continuum of goods like the one of Dornbusch et al. (1980). By
contrast this paper does not put the emphasis on decreasing transportation costs, but rather on the Rybczynski
e®ects associated with capital accumulation and on the e®ect of changes in relative prices.
3The work by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2005) is closely related to ours, as they also explain
the non-balanced nature of growth with a factor-proportions model. However, they model a
closed economy, and empirical work is not tackled, but only called for in their conclusion. Recent
papers on the dynamics of industrial concentration include Redding (2002), Xu (2003), Volpe
Martincus and P¶ edussel Wu (2005), and Debaere and Demiroglu (2003b). None of these papers
is directly interested in the diversi¯cation-concentration phenomenon in the world economy.
The ¯rst three papers use the methodology introduced by Kohli (1978), which is appropriate
for a world with at least as many factors as goods. We rather believe that there are more goods
than factors, and therefore use the better suited methodology introduced by Schott (2003).4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 estimates the production
side of the textbook Heckscher-Ohlin model. Section 3 decomposes the changes in industrial
concentration over time. The last section concludes.
2 The production side of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
2.1 The textbook HO 2 £ 2 model
Our general theoretical framework is the textbook 2 £ 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. We shall see
later how it is possible to make it empirically operational. There are N countries, n = 1;:::;N.
At date t, country n is endowed with a quantity Kt
n of capital and a quantity Lt
n of labor. There
are two goods that can be produced in each country, i = l;k. Good l is labor-intensive, and
good k is capital-intensive. There is no factor intensity reversal. Both goods are produced with
constant returns to scale (CRS) by competitive ¯rms, and the marginal product of each factor
is positive and decreasing. All countries have access to the same technology. Each country is
small and can freely trade goods on the world market at date-t prices taken as given. Countries
with a low capital-labor ratio (Kt
n=Lt
n 2 (¿0 = 0;¿t
1)) are specialized in the production of the









specialize in the production of the capital-intensive good.
With perfect competition and GDP maximization, the countries with a low capital endow-





















where n denotes a country (or \nation"), t a date and i = l;k: F l denotes the production
function for the labor-intensive good, and fl(k) ´ F l(k;1) makes use of its CRS property and
inherits concavity.
4Debaere and Demiroglu (2003b) is another paper studying the multiplicity of the cones of specialization.






































where F k denotes the production function for the capital-intensive good, and fk is concave.
Figure 1 represents the theoretically implied patterns of specialization.5 The dashed line
represents value-added per worker for the labor-intensive good over a country's \development
path". The solid line represents value-added per worker for the capital-intensive good. The
Rybczynski e®ect says that, as Figure 1 shows, capital accumulation in the cone of diversi¯cation
leads to a reduced production of the labor-intensive good and to an increased production of the
capital-intensive good. The thin straight line that is tangent to the two curves determines the
capital-labor ratios in the two industries (equal to ¿t
1 and ¿t
2). Figure 2 shows total value-added
per worker for the various levels of capital per worker. One can also easily show that the slope
of the value-added per capita curve (in Figure 2) is equal to the rental cost of capital, and that
the intercept of the tangent to this curve with the vertical axis is the compensation per worker.
Finally, Figure 3 shows how industrial concentration varies with a country's capital-labor ratio.
As Koren and Tenreyro (2006) make it clear, a particularly adequate measure of concentration
is the Her¯ndahl index. This is the one that Figure 3 presents.6 We do ¯nd a U-shaped curve
for industrial concentration when a country moves along its \development path", i.e. when it
accumulates capital (more rapidly than the rest of the world).
It is also well-known that a change in the relative price of the two goods or a biased tech-
nological progress should modify the structure of industrial production. For instance, if the
relative price of the capital-intensive good goes up or if technological progress is biased in its
direction, then the two cone cuto®s should move to the left, with more countries producing the
capital-intensive goods. This should raise the demand for capital in the cone of diversi¯cation,
and increase the rental cost of capital.
2.2 Empirical approach
We focus on the manufacturing sector as it should contain fewer non-tradables than other
sectors of the economy, such as the agricultural sector or the services. On the one hand, it
makes likely that our assumption that the law of one price holds internationally. On the other
5See Deardor® (1974, 1999) for further details.
6With only 2 goods, denoting by sl the share of the labor-intensive good in total value-added, and by sk the
share of the capital-intensive good, the Her¯ndahl index is simply HI = s2
l + s2
k. It attains a maximum of 1
when only one good is produced, and a minimum of 0.5 when the two shares are equal to 0.5.
5Production path of the labor−intensive good



















Figure 3: The Her¯ndahl index in the 2 £ 2 HO model.
8hand, including the agricultural and service sectors might provide a stricter test of the model
at stake.
To empirically evaluate this model, we shall assume that production within the cones of





























Recall that Equation 4 describes production in the ¯rst cone of specialization, whereas Equation
5 refers to the last cone in an economy's development path. Note that this is what we get in
the HO model with ¯xed coe±cients.






























Figure 4, that combines the information in Figures 2 and 3 with the linearization assumptions
in Equations 4 and 5, shows that we keep the nonlinearities implied by theory. Theory also
implies restrictions on the parameters. The restrictions are reported in Table 4.
As reality is much more complex than the 2£2 model, we momentarily turn to a model that
is more realistic, while still highly simpli¯ed. This is the \uneven" 2£m model, with 2 factors
(capital and labor) and m > 2 goods. In such a model with more goods than factors, production
is indeterminate, as there are many ways to maximize GDP (Melvin, 1968). Figure 5 represents
possible production patterns when there is one labor-intensive good, and two capital-intensive
goods. In the cone of diversi¯cation, a capital-accumulating country might maximize its GDP
by having the production patterns represented by the black lines (solid and dashed): in that
case, the country specializes in the production of the ¯rst capital-intensive good. But a country
might as well specialize in the production of the second capital-intensive good (green or grey
lines), and still maximize its GDP. One can also imagine that a country does not specialize,
and produces the two capital-intensive goods: production is indeterminate at the good level.7
The model considered here (with more goods than factors) is therefore di®erent from the
one underlying most of the empirical literature estimating Rybczynski relationships (including
7Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) ¯nd substantial evidence of production indeterminacy using data from
Japanese prefectures and from OECD countries. The evidence is stronger at the regional level. One might argue
that focusing on OECD countries introduces a downward bias in the measure of production indeterminacy. The
OECD exhibit diversi¯ed and roughly similar production patterns. These are factors that lead Bernstein and
Weinstein to favor a determinate production. The less developed countries tend to have extreme and di®erent
national specializations, which should make production more indeterminate. Finally, Schott's (2003) results at






Figure 4: Production patterns and value-added per worker with our simplifying assumptions.
10Possible production path for the first capital−intensive good (none of the second one is produced)
Possible production path for the second capital−intensive good (none of the first one is produced)
Corresponding production path for the labor−intensive good






Figure 5: Production indeterminacy in the cone of diversi¯cation: two development paths.
Kohli, 1978, Harrigan, 1995, 1997, Redding, 2002) that assumes production to be determinate
at the industry level and runs regressions at the industry level. The model considered here
requires a di®erent empirical approach.
Despite its complexity, the basic 2 £ 2 model might still provide a good description of the
world. First, we can group industries in \Heckscher-Ohlin" aggregates, as done by Schott
(2003): we group industries according to their capital-intensity, although industries are de-
¯ned in classi¯cations such as the International Industrial Classi¯cation (ISIC) as collections
of goods with similar end use. For instance, in Schott's (2003) preferred model, the footwear
industry in Panama is classi¯ed as belonging to a labor-intensive aggregate, while the Italian
footwear industry belongs to an aggregate with an average capital intensity.8 This aggregation
has important consequences: goods are de¯ned according to their capital intensity as in the
8With product-level U.S. import data, Schott (2004) ¯nds that factor heterogeneity also exists at the product
level, with capital and skill abundant countries specializing in high value products.
11production side of the HO model (when there is no factor intensity reversal as assumed in this
paper); we reduce the number of \goods". In addition, Figure 5 shows that, in our example,
the production indeterminacy disappears when we consider the two capital-intensive goods to-
gether: the production of this capital-intensive \aggregate" is almost determinate. By grouping
industries in HO aggregates, we have a good chance of solving the indeterminacy problem. The
linearity of the basic model might be lost, but is likely to remain a good approximation, as
Figure 5 indicates.
Second, total value-added per worker at the country level is not indeterminate, and theory
implies that there should be nonlinearities in the value-added per worker at the cone cuto®s.
We shall use this property to build our cones of specialization.
Third, following Tre°er (1993), we want to take into account factor-augmenting international
productivity di®erences. Let ¼t
fn be the productivity of factor f = K;L; in country n at date t.
If Kt















As we try to be as close as possible to the textbook 2 £ 2 model, the relevant quantities of
labor and capital are the ones used in the manufacturing sector:9 in the cone of diversi¯cation,
the production of each aggregate is dictated by the factor proportion in each sector and the
quantity of factors employed in manufacturing.































Note that we have to estimate the slopes, the intercepts and the cone cuto®s. Denoting by















n0jX] = 0;if n 6= n
0:
The conditional mean independence assumption for the disturbances might look strong
when one thinks about country-speci¯c e®ects, but it is theoretically justi¯ed when productivity
di®erences are factor-augmenting and factors are measured in e®ective units, which we attempt
to do. Finally, by allowing for some autocorrelation between the disturbances for a given
country, we can take into account remaining country-speci¯c productivity di®erences.
9This is the approach followed by Schott (2001).





























X1 0 ¢¢¢ 0
0 X2 0 ¢¢¢
...


















































































































































































Given our assumptions, the speci¯cation ¯ts into Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions (SUR) framework. We shall use the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method
to get e±cient estimates.
We form HO aggregates as in Schott (2003). For aggregate a = l;k, the value-added in
















and the quantities of labor and capital employed in aggregate a are de¯ned similarly. With
two aggregates, we have qt
l = 0, qt
l = qt, qt
k = qt, and qt
k = +1, with qt the HO aggregate
cuto® at date t. The empirical framework at the aggregate level is very similar to the one at
the manufacturing level. We assume that for each HO aggregate, the value-added per worker































At the HO aggregate level, we allow the residuals for a given country-aggregate to be auto-
correlated (remaining di®erences of productivity and di®erences in specialization, as Figure 5
shows). The cuto® between the two HO aggregates also has to be estimated.
13In terms of estimation, we begin by examining several cross-sections of industrial production
over our period of interest, 1975-1995. This consists of the following steps:
1. Using country data at the manufacturing level, estimate the slopes and cone intercepts
with constrained least squares for each year (year by year), for all possible cone cuto®s;
2. For each year, select the cone cuto®s that lead to the lowest sum of squared residuals;
3. Using country data at the industry level, use the selected cone cuto®s and a candidate HO
aggregate cuto® to estimate the aggregate intercepts and slopes with constrained least
squares, and do this for all possible HO aggregates cuto®s;
4. For each year, select the HO aggregate cuto® that minimizes the distance between the
estimated intercepts and slopes at the manufacturing and HO aggregate levels;
5. Using the cuto®s selected in the previous steps, compute SUR year-by-year estimates with
FGLS.
To make use of the time dimension of the data, and since estimated cuto®s do not seem
to vary much over time,10 we then proceed by performing panel data estimation with country
¯xed e®ects as follows:11
1. Pooling all country data available at the manufacturing level, estimate the slopes and
cone intercepts with constrained least squares for all possible cone cuto®s;
2. Select the cone cuto®s that lead to the lowest sum of squared residuals;
3. Again pooling all available country data, but now at the industry level, use the selected
cone cuto®s and grid candidate HO aggregate cuto®s to estimate the intercepts and
slopes for each HO aggregate with constrained least squares. Repeat for all possible HO
aggregates cuto®s;
4. Select the HO aggregate cuto® that minimizes the distance between the estimated inter-
cepts and slopes at the manufacturing and HO aggregate levels;
5. Using the cuto®s selected in the previous steps, run constrained least squares with country
¯xed e®ects on the country/year panel at the manufacturing level and at the HO aggregate
level.
10[Present formal test here.]
11[Not done yet.]
14While the approach followed by Schott (2003) is very close to the canonical HO model of
production, the approach taken in our paper gets even closer to it: we allow for the possibility
of cones of full specialization, which makes sense particularly when taking HO aggregates in
place of the traditional goods or industries, and we keep the decreasing returns to capital (when
moving from one cone to another) assumed in neoclassical trade theory.
A similar procedure might also be used to estimate the HO model with two cones and three
goods, the model preferred by Schott (2003). Note that, if this were the right model, the ¯rst
two steps of our estimation procedure would show that countries are all along the second and
third straight (thick) lines in Figure 4: the countries in the ¯rst cone of diversi¯cation would
lie along the second line; the countries in the second cone of diversi¯cation would lie along the
third line; and no country would specialize in the goods of the ¯rst HO aggregate.
Our approach might be re¯ned: we might be able to divide our capital-intensive HO aggre-
gate between a middle HO aggregate and a (more) capital-intensive HO aggregate, as in Schott
(2003). But ¯nding the cuto® between these last two aggregates is less immediate than ¯nding
the ¯rst cuto®. For instance, Schott (2003) assumed that none of the middle aggregate is pro-
duced by the country with the highest capital-labor ratio. This is possible but assuming it is
quite arbitrary. A way to study this possibility is the following. As theory indicates, countries
around the cuto® between the second and third cone should produce none of the labor-intensive
aggregate, and, for these countries, the output of our current capital-intensive aggregate should
be the same as the output of this hypothetical middle aggregate. If ¯nding a cuto® between
the middle aggregate and the more capital-intensive aggregate is impossible, then we know that
the world behaves like in the HO model with two goods, and not three.12
2.3 Data and construction of the main variables
We use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2005a,b)
and the Penn World Table version 6.1 (PWT) (Heston et al., 2002).
The UNIDO data set (revision 2 at the 3-digit level) presents data for 28 sectors, but
several countries aggregate data for two or more sectors (like \food products" and \beverages")
into a larger one. To appropriately recognize missing data and to make data comparable
across countries, we follow Koren and Tenreyro (2005) and aggregate sectors so as to obtain a
consistent classi¯cation across countries. This leaves us with the 19 sectors or industries listed
in Table 1.
Capital
To compute the stocks of capital at the industry level, we use investment data from the
UNIDO at the 3-digit (UNIDO, 2005a) and 4-digit (UNIDO, 2005b) levels. The ¯rst database
provides data for the period 1963-2001, and the second database covers the period 1985-2001.
The second database contains data missing in the ¯rst one. The two matrices were merged.13 We
12[To be done soon.]
13Even after merger, the database contains many holes. In order to compute stocks of capital, we had to
151 Food products; beverages; tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel, except footwear
4 Leather products
5 Footwear, except rubber and plastic
6 Wood products, except furniture
7 Furniture, except metal
8 Paper and products
9 Printing and publishing
10 Industrial chemicals; petroleum re¯neries; petroleum and coal products
11 Rubber products
12 Plastic products
13 Pottery, china, earthenware; glass; other non-metallic mineral products
14 Iron and steel; non-ferrous metals
15 Fabricated metal products; machinery, except electrical
16 Machinery, electric
17 Transport equipment
18 Professional and scienti¯c equipment
19 Other manufactured products
Table 1: List of sectors.
took investment in current U.S. dollars, and used exchange rates from the PWT to translate
these numbers in the current national currency. Implicit national investment de°ators were
computed as the ratio value of national investment in current national currency units (ICUR)
/ value of national investment in 1996 national constant prices (IKON). We then used the
perpetual inventory method to compute stocks of capital at the sectoral level. The exact
formula is the one used by Leamer (1984, p. 233).14
In this paper, as in all works with international cross-sections involving quantities of factors,
one of the main di±culties is to build data comparable across countries, which is especially true
for the stocks of capital (Leamer, 1984). The approach, since Tre°er (1993), is to correct
for the heterogeneity in the productivity of capital. The work by Tre°er (1993) is usually
interpreted as indicating a strong correlation between the purchasing power parity-adjusted
price of investment goods (as measured by the PWT) and their productivity. Following these
results, Debaere and Demiroglu (2003a,b) used the price of investment goods given in the PWT
as a measure of capital productivity. The idea is that a higher price indicates a higher quality,
poorly measured by the PWT. With this method, the measured investment is adjusted upward
when investment is reported to be costly.
make assumptions about these missing values. When there are holes within a sequence and when there are less
than 6 consecutive years of missing data, the sequence was completed using a linear interpolation. When the
beginning (end) of a sequence is missing, we replaced the last (¯rst) three missing values with an average of the
¯rst (last) three available values.
14We ¯nally kept capital stock estimates only when we have at least 8 consecutive years of investment data
(once holes are ¯lled as explained in the previous note).
16Instead, we think that it is more natural to use the cost of equipment goods15 estimated by
in Eaton and Kortum (2001) for the year 1985 as a proxy for the inverse of the productivity
of capital.16 Using trade data for equipment capital, their paper shows systematic di®erences
in the absolute prices of equipment goods between rich and poor countries, with these goods
being cheaper in rich countries. As a result, we use the measured price of equipment capital
to adjust the reported investment downward when investment is costly.17 Ideally we should
use price estimates for each year, rather than the Eaton-Kortum's (2001) estimates for 1985.
Nevertheless, this measure is broadly appropriate. First, as long as the relative GDPs per capita
and the relationship between GDP per capita and the cost of capital remain constant over time,
we can use relative prices in any year, including 1985. Second, for countries that catch up with
the richest countries during the whole period, we should overestimate real investment in the
years before 1985, and underestimate it for the years after 1985, with the measurement errors
cancelling each other at least partially for the latest years. Eaton and Kortum (2001) provide
estimates for many countries, but not for all the countries in our sample. For the countries
without estimates, we use a predicted value based on their results.18 Finally, investment in
equipment goods is only part of the total capital investment. Our adjustment is appropriate if
the real cost of the other capital goods (taking into account di®erences in absolute prices and
productivity) is well approximated by the real cost of the equipment goods.
In order to evaluate the impact of adjusting for the absence of purchasing power parity
(PPP), we redo all our estimations using PPP adjusted data. The results are not signi¯cantly
a®ected, although the overall ¯t is poorer, as detailed in the Appendix.19
Labor
To measure the quantity of labor in a given industry and at the manufacturing level, we
use data from the UNIDO database. These data are corrected for the heterogeneity of human
capital using the method proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) and used, for instance, by Debaere
and Demiroglu (2003a,b).20 Data on educational achievement are from Barro and Lee (2000).
15Electrical machinery, nonelectrical machinery, and instruments.
16Eaton and Kortum (2001) conduct a structural estimation of these costs. Their empirical model is a
Ricardian model with \transportation costs" and a continuum of heterogeneous goods. They estimate the
costs parameters that are consistent with their model and with observed bilateral trade data. This theoretical
approach and ours are notably di®erent. Our assumption of identical selling prices might be contradicted by the
existence of transportation costs. (See Deardor® (1979) on the consequence of transportation costs in the HO
model.) Nevertheless, a careful examination of their results indicates that the contradiction is more apparent
than real. Indeed, they ¯nd that a major impediment to importing capital goods is a low educational attainment.
We can therefore interpret their model as one with productivity di®erences that act as barriers to trade. This
interpretation is consistent with the production side of the HO model and with our empirical implementation.
17Interestingly, the strong (negative) correlation between the cost of capital and real GDP per capita suggests
using trade data as Eaton and Kortum (2001) to solve the \endowments paradox" exposed by Tre°er (1995).
18The estimated relationship is PKn = 4:53 ¡ 0:70ln(y1985
n ), where y1985
n is country n's real GDP per capita
relative to the US in 1985 (100 for the US). We then use ¼Kn = 1=PKn.
19[To be done.]






171975 1985 1995 All years
Country Abbr. K¤
n=L¤
n ^ ¦Ln K¤
n=L¤





Australia AUS 5,902 2.21 7,477 2.25 1.63
Austria AUT 14,986 1.96 18,142 2.14 24,618 2.18 1.36
Bangladesh BGD 312 1.29 235 1.34 3.32
Bolivia BOL 4,765 1.52 3,110 1.64 2.88
Canada CAN 7,450 2.25 10,695 2.34 1.24
Chile CHL 4,412 1.67 3,814 1.76 5,383 1.94 2.42
Colombia COL 1,895 1.53 3,137 1.56 2,816 1.64 2.50
Cyprus CYP 8,636 1.81 6,238 2.02 6,464 2.11 1.96
Denmark DNK 16,448 2.15 14,640 2.23 1.15
Ecuador ECU 5,417 1.48 7,202 1.70 7,831 1.81 2.52
Egypt EGY 2,346 1.18 3,303 1.37 1,912 1.55 4.46
El Salvador SLV 3,866 1.49 2,890 1.49 2.68
Ethiopia ETH 475 1.07 3.97
Finland FIN 11,762 1.90 13,888 2.01 18,596 2.28 1.61
France FRA 30,589 2.06 1.13
Greece GRC 10,972 1.70 10,786 1.88 9,941 2.03 2.55
Guatemala GTM 4,007 1.19 2,935 1.30 2.65
Hong-Kong HKG 4,314 1.87 11,015 2.10 1.60
Hungary HUN 4,090 1.86 4,451 1.92 2.03
India IND 1,598 1.32 2,685 1.42 2.07
Indonesia IDN 932 1.29 1,096 1.43 1,653 1.50 2.91
Ireland IRL 10,141 1.99 13,618 2.13 1.84
Israel ISR 7,175 1.91 10,521 2.11 12,063 2.13 1.82
Italy ITA 23,148 1.70 26,246 1.76 23,383 1.87 1.11
Japan JPN 25,235 1.91 26,131 2.09 36,330 2.23 0.99
Korea (Rep.) KOR 7,326 1.72 9,986 2.04 25,468 2.34 1.47
Malawi MWI 3,668 1.23 2.49
Malaysia MYS 2,383 1.43 3,739 1.57 5,458 1.92 2.33
Mexico MEX 6,363 1.80 2.08
Netherlands NLD 16,064 1.97 21,892 2.06 29,528 2.16 1.54
New-Zealand NZL 5,530 2.25 10,612 2.33 2.14
Norway NOR 10,790 1.97 14,662 2.07 14,269 2.44 1.78
Pakistan PAK 11,284 1.21 5,202 1.23 9,287 1.31 2.33
Panama PAN 4,659 1.59 3,728 1.79 3,504 2.00 2.33
Peru PER 1,595 1.74 3,655 1.94 2.46
Philippines PHL 2,412 1.75 2,540 1.94 2,896 2.07 2.45
Poland POL 1,953 2.10 2.22
Portugal PRT 5,871 1.43 7,358 1.54 7,138 1.70 1.95
Singapore SGP 8,880 1.51 15,708 1.54 17,937 1.94 1.73
Spain ESP 12,023 1.72 12,663 1.90 1.55
Sri Lanka LKA 906 1.68 580 1.73 2.29
Sweden SWE 16,959 2.02 21,296 2.14 1.09
Thailand THA 7,921 1.64 2.70
Trinidad and Tobaggo TTO 4,370 1.70 8,437 1.79 1.83
Tunisia TUN 6,394 1.16 2.40
Turkey TUR 3,703 1.32 3,254 1.48 6,592 1.65 2.78
United Kingdom GBR 9,585 1.89 14,567 1.96 19,004 2.04 0.99
USA USA 9,122 2.32 13,067 2.57 16,107 2.66 1.00
Uruguay URY 3,275 1.81 2.25
Venezuela VEN 8,186 1.69 15,532 1.71 2.15
Number of obs. 50 32 44 42
Notes: Capital and labor are measured in e®ective units. Capital is in 1996 U.S. dollars.
Table 2: Geographic coverage and some key variables.
18Value-added
We computed numbers for value-added in 1996 U.S. dollars, using the exchange rates and
national de°ators implicitly given by the PWT. Note that we do not use PPP-adjusted values:
we assume that all goods produced with the same capital-labor ratio can be sold at the same
price on international markets, as in the HO model. We conjecture that the observed deviations
from absolute PPP at the retail level can be well explained by di®erences in distribution costs
across countries. Distribution services (local land and labor) are mostly nontradable, and can
therefore di®er importantly across countries. As these distribution costs account for 50% of
the retail prices (Burstein et al. (2003)), di®erences in distribution prices can generate huge
di®erences in retail prices.21 Thus we do not assume that the law of one price holds at the
retail level, but we assume that it holds at the producer level.
Correcting for the productivity and costs di®erences for the two factors has a signi¯cant
impact on the relative capital-labor ratios: Table 2 reveals that the correction factor for capital
is the most important. As a result, the relative capital-labor ratio for the typical less developed
country shrinks.22
2.4 Estimation of the development paths, 1975-1995
Table 4 and Figures 6-14 present the results of the estimation of the HO model for the years
1975, 1985, and 1995.23 The overall results indicate that the production patterns of the world
economy observed during the period 1975-1995 are consistent with the production side of the
2 £ 2 HO model.
Our results indicate that almost all countries were in the cone of diversi¯cation in 1975.
Ventura (1997) has shown that this has important implications for growth: as long as coun-
tries lie in this cone, there is no reduction in the marginal product of capital when countries
accumulate capital, because \resources are moved from labor-intensive to capital-intensive in-







is the fraction of the population over 25 with e years of education.
21Studying the behavior of real exchange rates after large devaluations, Burstein et al. (2005) ¯nd that
deviations from relative PPP are well explained by the slow adjustment in the price of nontradable goods and
services.
22[We plan to study whether our results are robust to these adjustments.]
23Outliers have been excluded from the regressions: Pakistan for 1975, Jordan and Peru for 1985, and Ireland
for 1995. For 1975, the inclusion of Pakistan (high capital-intensity, low value-added per worker) leads to a
non-concave shape. For 1985, the inclusion of Jordan (high capital-intensity, low value-added per worker) leads
to a negative return to capital in the capital-intensive cone. Still for 1985, including Peru would lead to an
abrupt drop of the ¯rst cone cuto®, which would reduce the HO aggregate cuto® incredibly. But, once the cone
cuto® is estimated, the inclusion of Peru leads to non-signi¯cant changes of the other estimates. For 1995, the
inclusion of Ireland has minor e®ects on the results [to be included].







Other manufactured products 4,209
Fabricated metal products 5,214
Printing and publishing 5,587
Textiles 6,581







Pottery, china, earthenware 12,326
Iron and steel 16,720
Paper and products 17,634
Industrial chemicals 30,620
Notes: Capital and labor are measured in e®ective units. Capital is in 1996 U.S. dollars.
Table 3: Industry capital-labor ratios, United-States, 1975.
a world with two sectors and the ability to trade, developing countries can \beat the curse of
diminishing returns."
At the HO-aggregate level, the model performs well. When comparing our results with the
ones obtained by Schott (2003), casual observation tends to show that we obtain a better ¯t to
the data (see the Appendix). In addition, contrary to Schott (2003), we ¯nd the concavity of
the value-added per worker implied by the HO model.
One way to see if our results make sense is to look at the intercepts and slopes. With
constant returns to scale and perfect competition, value-added is shared by the workers and the












For the second and third cones, the intercept provides an estimate of the annual wage of
an e®ective unit of labor, measured in 1996 U.S. dollars. The slope gives an estimate of the
rental cost of capital (divided by ¼kn). Together these estimates can be used to ¯nd the shares
of income received by each production factor. For the countries in the cone of diversi¯cation,
the estimated real wages for an e®ective unit of labor are $6,000 for 1975, $4,500 for 1985, and
$6,500 for 1995. In the cone specialized in the production of the capital-intensive aggregate,
we get estimated wages of $19,000 for 1975, $13,000 for 1985 and $15,000 for 1995. When
20Cuto® Manufacturing level Labor-intensive Capital-intensive
or coe±cient HO aggregate HO aggregate
¿1975
1 3,500 3,500 3,500
¿1975
2 17,000 17,000 17,000
q1975 6,500 6,500
®1975
1 0 0 0
®1975
2 10,723*** 10,290*** 0
(1,287) (893)
®1975
3 28,168*** 0 27,976***
(1,924) (1,102)
¯1975
1 3.06*** 2.94*** 0
(0.37) (0.26)
¯1975
2 1.29*** -0.76*** 2.07***
(0.20) (0.07) (0.08)
¯1975
3 0.51 0 0.49*
(0.47) (0.29)
Constraints ®1975
1 = 0 ®1975
1 = 0 ®1975
1 = 0
®1975




1 = 0 ¡®1975
2 + 3;500¯1975










1 3,000 3,000 3,000
¿1985
2 12,000 12,000 12,000
q1985 5,500 5,500
®1985
1 0 0 0
®1985
2 9,249*** 8,133*** 0
(1,098) (617)
®1985
3 23,393*** 0 22,194***
(1,336) (1,019)
¯1985
1 3.08*** 2.71*** 0
(0.37) (0.21)
¯1985
2 1.57*** -0.90*** 2.47***
(0.21) (0.07) (0.11)
¯1985
3 0.87*** 0 1.01***
(0.21) (0.16)
Constraints ®1985
1 = 0 ®1985
1 = 0 ®1985
1 = 0
®1985




1 = 0 ¡®1985
2 + 3;000¯1985










1 3,000 3,000 3,000
¿1995
2 16,000 16,000 16,000
q1995 7,000 7,000
®1995
1 0 0 0
®1995
2 10,183*** 10,413*** 0
(1,158) (816)
®1995
3 26,787*** 0 25,397***
(1,566) (1,152)
¯1995
1 3.39*** 3.47*** 0
(0.36) (0.27)
¯1995
2 1.28*** -0.80*** 1.95***
(0.17) (0.06) (0.09)
¯1995
3 0.76*** 0 0.82***
(0.17) (0.13)
Constraints ®1995
1 = 0 ®1995
1 = 0 ®1995
1 = 0
®1995




1 = 0 ¡®1995
2 + 3;000¯1995






2 = 0 ®1995
2 + 13;000¯1995
2 = 0
Notes: The Table reports the estimates of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions with the indicated linear constraints on the coe±cients.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table 4: Cuto® and coe±cient estimates for the 2 £ 2 model.












































Figure 6: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, manufacturing level, 1975.






































































































































































Figure 8: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, capital-intensive aggregate, 1975.






















































































































































































Figure 10: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, labor-intensive aggregate, 1985.


































































































































































































Figure 12: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, manufacturing level, 1995.























































































































































































Figure 14: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, capital-intensive aggregate, 1995.
multiplied by the productivity factors, these estimates give values for annual wages of the right








) is approximately 35% for 1975, 30% for 1985, and 40%
for 1995. For the countries in the second cone of specialization, we get estimated labor shares
of 60% for 1975, 45% for 1985 and 1995. Given that these labor shares are speci¯c to the
manufacturing sector, they are reasonable and con¯rm that our estimates make sense.
The estimated rental costs of capital appear to be too high, but their estimates depend
heavily on the chosen depreciation rate of capital, and our chosen depreciation rate of 13.3%
(the same as in Schott, 2003) might be too high. A lower depreciation rate would lead to lower
rental costs of capital. It is also instructive to compare the estimated rental cost of capital
within each cross-section. Our results are in the spirit of Caselli and Feyrer (2006). In both
cases, the ¯nancial rate of return of investing in physical capital is not much higher in poor
countries. Using data from the PWT, Caselli and Feyrer ¯nd that the marginal product of
capital is much higher on average in poor countries, but they show that this is compensated
by a relatively high cost of investment goods in these countries. In our paper, the prices of
industrial (including equipment) goods are assumed to be equalized by trade. But we also
¯nd that the marginal product of e®ective capital is much higher in less developed countries
(concavity of the value-added per worker curve). In our paper, ¯nancial rates of return are
made more equal by productivity di®erences, leading to di®erences in the real cost of e®ective
26capital.
When comparing the results for the di®erent years, we see that, for K=L 2 [0;17;000], the
value-added per unit of labor \curve" is more concave in 1975 and 1995 than in 1985. For the
1975-1985 period, this is consistent with both a relative price increase of the capital-intensive
goods and a technical progress biased in favor of these goods. As predicted by theory, this
leads to a change in the HO aggregates and cones cuto®s: with these price changes or with this
technological progress, the demand for capital increases and the relative cost of capital goes
up. This leads to a substitution towards labor and a shift to the left of all the cuto®s. The
opposite changes can be observed between 1985 and 1995.
On a di®erent but related topic, the results lend mixed support to the \late-bloomers model"
developed by Atkeson and Kehoe (2006). In a dynamic HO model with two sectors, they
show that the timing of development is important. When a country begins its development
process later than most of the rest of the world (a late-bloomer), this country ends up with
a permanently lower level of income than the early-bloomers. Starting outside the cone of
diversi¯cation, the late-bloomer accumulates capital until the country reaches the lower edge
of the cone of diversi¯cation. The late-bloomer never catches up with the rest of the world.
Figures 6 and 9 reveal that, in 1985, an important fraction of the countries were located exactly
at the lower edge of the cone of diversi¯cation: almost one third (30%) of the countries were
having a capital-labor ratio between 3,000 and 5,000 (1996) U.S. dollars per e®ective worker
while the estimated capital-labor ratio cuto® is 3,000 (1996) U.S. dollars per worker. This is
exactly what is predicted by Atkeson and Kehoe's model. On the other hand, Figure 12 shows
that in 1995 less countries were having a capital-labor ratio around the cuto®: the fraction of
countries with a capital-labor ratio between 2,000 and 4,000 went down to 20%, with countries
like Hong-Kong and Turkey keeping accumulating capital. But many South American countries
with a capital-labor ratio around the cuto® in 1985 seem to be stuck with a low level of capital.
3 Heckscher-Ohlin and the U-shaped industrial concen-
tration curve
3.1 Decomposing the change in the Her¯ndahl index
To measure the concentration of a country's manufacturing sector, we focus on the Her¯ndahl














ni the value-added of sector i. In a recent paper, Koren and Tenreyro (2006) decompose
the variance of GDP per capita for a given country, and show that the Her¯ndahl index (HI)
27is one of its main components: everything else equal, the countries with most concentrated
manufacturing sectors are the ones with the most volatile growth rates.
To isolate the e®ect of the neoclassical factors, we proceed as follows. With two HO aggre-







































and similarly for the k aggregate: the total HI is a weighted sum of the Her¯ndahl indices at
the HO aggregate level, with the weights equal to the shares of the aggregates raised to the


















































We now study four hypothetical cases to provide simple intuition about this decomposi-
tion.24 In all cases, there are two aggregates with two industries in each aggregate.
Case 1: The Rybczynski e®ect


















k2 ) = (10;10;20;20):
Concentration does not change within each aggregate and therefore there is no within-aggregate
change. We have ¢HIt;t+1









2 = ¡0:069 + 0:097. The
concentration index goes up as the shares of the two aggregates become more unequal. The
between-e®ect can be considered to be an \Heckscher-Ohlin e®ect": it is due to a shift of
production to a set of goods that use a factor intensively. Such a shift can be explained by
the neoclassical trade model and its direct extensions: Rybczynski e®ects, biased technological
24This decomposition is di®erent from, but reminiscent of the decomposition used by Bound et al. (1994)
or Bernard and Jensen (1997) to study changes in the composition of the workforce in U.S. manufacturing
(unskilled versus skilled workers).
28progress, change in relative prices, or a decline in transportation costs combined with compar-
ative advantages µ a la HO.
Case 2: The e®ect of the heterogeneity in HIa
In the above example, the Her¯ndahl indices were the same for the two aggregates. By
doing so, we could isolate the mechanism introduced at the beginning of the paper. But one
must recognize that this is the interaction between the changes in shares and the concentrations
of the aggregates that matters. Everything else equal, the HI for manufacturing increases when
the share of the most concentrated HO aggregate goes up.
As a result, the between-e®ect can be positive even though the two aggregate shares become
more equal: this can happen when the growing aggregate is more concentrated than the other

















k2 ) = (10;50;30;30):
This result contradicts our initial intuition, but once again this is specialization µ a la HO (com-
bined with the unequal concentration of the two aggregates) that drives the results.
Our empirical results show that the later particular situation is unusual: in a vast majority
of cases, the shares of the two aggregates become more unequal when the between e®ect is
positive, and the shares become more equal when the between e®ect is negative.
Case 3: Within e®ect only

















k2 ) = (10;20;10;20):
The share of each aggregate does not change: there is no between e®ect. The Her¯ndahl index
changes by ¢HIt;t+1






na) = 0:014 + 0:014. The
concentration index rises as each aggregate becomes more concentrated. A signi¯cant within
e®ect can be due to a decline in transportation costs combined with comparative advantages µ a
la Ricardo, or with economies of scale as studied in the new economic geography literature.
Case 4: Between e®ect and within e®ect together
What's happening when a relatively large sector grows in a given HO aggregate? There
should be both a within e®ect and a between e®ect: the HO aggregate that contains this good
becomes more concentrated, and the share of this HO aggregate goes up. This can be checked

















k2 ) = (10;10;20;10):
The Her¯ndahl index changes by ¢HIt;t+1
n = 0:280¡0:250 = 0:017+0:013, where 0:017 is the
within e®ect and 0:013 is the between e®ect.
29The composition e®ect
When computing this decomposition, we rely on one of two procedures: either we take the
actual composition of the HO aggregates at each date, or we keep it constant over time to get
rid of a \composition e®ect", due to the fact that some ISIC sectors move across aggregates
over time. When this occurs, we might have a case in which the share of each sector remains
constant over time, and one sector moves to the largest aggregate. In such a situation, the
overall HI does not change, but the measured between e®ect tends to be positive. When we















meaning that we keep the composition of the HO aggregates constant over time. In the above
examples, industries are supposed to remain in the same aggregate over time: there is no
composition e®ect, and the two measures (with and without correction for the composition
e®ect) coincide. The two measures are complementary and it is not obvious that the second one
(with the correction) is better than the ¯rst one. When one industry moves from one aggregate
to another, this is of interest as this indicates a shift to the production of another type of
products within the same ISIC industry, which is also a kind of Heckscher-Ohlin specialization.
As a result, we shall insist on the countries for which the two measures have the same sign: when
they are both positive for a given country, this shows that the between-e®ect made the country's
industry more concentrated, while two negative measures indicate that the between-e®ect lead
to a more diversi¯ed industry. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the measure taking
into account the composition e®ect is much easier to interpret.
One might argue that we obtain the U-shaped curve because we assume that there are
two HO aggregates. The situation looks di®erent in the case with three aggregates, like in
Schott's (2003) preferred model. In that case, a country starting with a very small K¤=L¤ that
accumulates capital will ¯rst diversify producing goods in both the labor-intensive HO aggregate
and the middle HO aggregate, but will then exhibit a concentration of its manufacturing sector,




k), there is a U-curve when the country moves across the ¯rst cone.
If the country then moves across the second cone, there will be a second U-curve! This seems
to contradict the single U-curve observed in the data. We might still reconcile this implication
of theory with the observed facts: we still get the U-curve when the middle aggregate is much
more diversi¯ed than the two extreme ones, which is likely to be true. Equation 7 makes that
mechanism clear.
It must also be noted that our empirical approach fails to measure changes in specialization
within an HO aggregate due to changes in factor proportions (like a move towards capital-
intensive goods within the capital-intensive HO aggregate when there is capital accumulation).25
25We plan to look at these e®ects soon.
303.2 Results of the decomposition for the 1975-1985 and 1985-1995
periods
In Subsection 2.4, we checked that the cross-sectional structure of industrial production is con-
sistent with the HO model. But, for one interested in the evolution of industrial concentration
at the national level, what matters is the ability to predict changes in a country's structure of
production over time. It is thus important to check that changes in industrial specialization
between aggregates are due to neoclassical factors (change in K=L, change in relative prices,
biased technological change). We compute the shares of both aggregates as predicted by our






























na;a = l;k: (8)

















We can then compute the change in shares for both aggregates caused by the neoclassical
factors. Figures 15 and 16 report the actual changes in the share of the labor-intensive aggregate,
as well as the changes predicted by the neoclassical factors. Changes of specialization across
aggregates are indeed well explained by the neoclassical factors. As a result, when computing
the between-aggregate change, we get a good estimate of the change of HI due to the neoclassical
factors (Rybczynski e®ect, change in the relative price of the two HO aggregates, technological
change biased towards an HO aggregate).
We decompose changes of industrial concentration over 10-year periods: 1975-1985 and
1985-1995. Tables 5-6 present the results. They indicate important di®erences between the
two estimates (corrected for the \composition e®ect" or not), meaning that ISIC industries
move across HO aggregates over time. Clear conclusions can still be drawn for the countries for
which the two estimates have the same sign. We ¯nd that the neoclassical e®ects are clear for
approximately one half of the countries. In most cases (16 out of 18 countries for 1975-1985, 16
out of 19 countries for 1985-1995), HO e®ects contribute positively to the evolution of industrial
concentration: for these countries, the HO e®ect is unambiguously positive when the overall HI
goes up, and unambiguously negative when the HI goes down. A negative contribution does
not mean that the neoclassical factors are not important: for instance, when the overall change
in HI is positive and the between e®ect negative (as for Austria for 1985-1995), this means that




























































































































































































2¢HI Between Within Between (Compo. e®.) Within
Country (£1000) (£1000) (% of ¢HI) (£1000) (£1000) (% of ¢HI) (£1000)
Australia -3.8 6.5 -172 -10.2 -0.6 16 -3.2
Austria** 1.2 1.4 114 -0.2 1.4 114 -0.2
Canada** 2.4 19 779 -16.5 0.5 20 1.9
Chile** 30 32.9 109 -2.8 14 47 16
Colombia 22.6 -51.3 -227 74 0 0 22.6
Cyprus** -15.9 -32.3 203 16.4 -8.1 51 -7.8
Denmark** 5.4 2.2 40 3.2 1 19 4.4
Ecuador** -49.9 -23.6 47 -26.3 -33.1 66 -16.8
Egypt** -35.0 -1.9 5 -33 -0.2 1 -34.8
Finland** 1.7 13.2 758 -11.5 1.2 67 0.6
Greece* 4.2 -7.9 -188 12.1 -2.9 -69 7.1
Guatemala* 12.1 -9.8 -81 21.9 -0.1 -1 12.2
Indonesia -96.5 0 0 -96.5 0 0 -96.5
Israel 26.6 33.1 125 -6.5 -1.1 -4 27.7
Italy 3.2 7.9 249 -4.8 -1.4 -44 4.6
Japan** 10.6 0.9 8 9.7 0.9 8 9.7
Korea (Rep.) -24 12.1 -50 -36.1 -11 46 -13
Malaysia** -4.7 -24.5 517 19.7 -1.5 31 -3.3
Netherlands** 8 10.1 126 -2.1 5.1 63 2.9
New Zealand 6 21.3 352 -15.2 -1.1 -18 7.2
Norway** 10.2 10.9 107 -0.7 1.4 14 8.7
Pakistan -27.6 -92.3 334 64.6 1 -4 -28.7
Panama -79.1 24.2 -31 -103.3 -33.4 42 -45.7
Philippines** -23 -71.2 309 48.1 -8.6 37 -14.4
Portugal** 0.8 4.8 577 -4 0.9 105 0
Singapore** 42.8 48.7 114 -5.9 14.2 33 28.7
Sweden** 1.4 5.8 411 -4.4 0.6 45 0.8
Turkey** -7.8 -5.9 76 -1.9 -2.5 32 -5.2
United Kingdom -0.1 -1.4 1,064 1.3 0.9 -681 -1.1
USA 1.6 11.5 710 -9.9 -0.4 -23 2
Venezuela 28.9 -58.1 -201 87 1.6 6 27.3
Number of obs. 31
Same sign as ¢HI 23 21
Sign opposite of ¢HI 7 8
Note: ** indicates a country for which the two between e®ects (without and with the correction) have the same
sign and indicate a positive contribution to the evolution of industrial concentration. * indicates a country
for which the two between e®ects have the same sign and indicate a negative contribution to the evolution of
industrial concentration.
Table 5: Decomposition of the change in the Her¯ndahl index, 1975-1985.
33¢HI Between Within Between (Compo. e®.) Within
Country (£1000) (£1000) (% of ¢HI) (£1000) (£1000) (% of ¢HI) (£1000)
Austria* -3.0 4.2 -142 -7.2 1.5 -51 -4.5
Bangladesh -34.8 0 0 -34.8 0 0 -34.8
Bolivia -93 13.9 -15 -106.9 -122.7 132 29.7
Canada** 7.3 6.5 90 0.8
Chile** -36.3 -2.5 7 -33.8 -2.4 6 -34
Colombia -15.8 52.5 -333 -68.2 -1.0 6 -14.8
Cyprus** 19.9 23.1 116 -3.2 25.6 129 -5.7
Ecuador 116.8 -9.8 -8 126.6 42.3 36 74.5
Egypt** 4.7 48.6 1,040 -43.9 16.3 348 -11.6
El Salvador** -24.1 -35.6 148 11.6 -8.7 36 -15.4
Finland 17.4 -10.8 -62 28.2 5.3 31 12.1
Greece** 13.2 5.3 40 7.9 3.9 29 9.3
Hong-Kong** -19.6 -47.4 242 27.8 -12.0 62 -7.5
Hungary** 59.9 31.0 52 28.9 28.3 47 31.6
India 13 -21.8 -167 34.8 0 0 13
Indonesia -28.5 0 0 -28.5 0 0 -28.5
Ireland 16.6 -28.3 -171 44.9 8.1 49 8.5
Israel** -22.5 -9.9 44 -12.6 -2.7 12 -19.8
Italy 6.9 -12 -174 18.9 0 0 6.9
Japan** 3.8 0.7 18 3.1 0.3 7 3.5
Korea (Rep.)** 12.1 11.1 91 1 6.1 50 6
Malaysia** 8.4 3 36 5.3 3.3 39 5.1
Netherlands 9.6 0 0 9.6 0 0 9.6
Norway -7.4 -6.2 84 -1.2 0.6 -8 -8
Pakistan -18.9 91.4 -483 -110.3 3.9 -21 -22.8
Panama** 90.9 58.1 64 32.8 35.7 39 55.2
Philippines** -62.2 -3.4 6 -58.8 -3.4 6 -58.8
Portugal 0.3 -7.0 -2,730 7.2 1.9 756 -1.7
Singapore** 35.6 13.3 37 22.3 11.4 32 24.2
Spain** -4.6 -11.4 246 6.8 -0.9 18 -3.8
Sri Lanka -130.6 0 0 -130.6 0 0 -130.6
Sweden 1.7 -4.8 -277 6.5 0 0 1.7
Turkey* -14.4 69.0 -478 -83.5 2.3 -16 -16.8
United Kingdom -1.4 -2.5 177 1.1 0.9 -68 -2.3
USA -3.3 -1.2 37 -2.1 1.3 -38 -4.5
Venezuela* -17.6 131.5 -749 -149.1 6.2 -35 -23.8
Number of obs. 36
Same sign as ¢HI 18 22
Sign opposite of ¢HI 13 7
Note: ** indicates a country for which the two between e®ects (without and with the correction) have the same
sign and indicate a positive contribution to the evolution of industrial concentration. * indicates a country
for which the two between e®ects have the same sign and indicate a negative contribution to the evolution
of industrial concentration. For Canada, capital data could not be constructed for 1995, which makes the
computation of the \standard" between e®ect impossible.
Table 6: Decomposition of the change in the Her¯ndahl index, 1985-1995.
34Tables 5-6 present detailed results at the country level, but what is the average contribution
of the neoclassical factors underlined here? Is that contribution quantitatively important? A
simple regression of the between-aggregate change (corrected for the composition e®ect) on




Between = 0:22(0:05)¢HI ¡ 0:93(1:33); R
2 = 0:44:
When dropping Indonesia that appears to be an outlier, the results change to:
¢HI
Compo:eff:
Between = 0:34(0:04)¢HI ¡ 1:47(0:99); R
2 = 0:71:
The same regression for the 1985-1995 period gives:
¢HI
Compo:eff:
Between = 0:37(0:08)¢HI + 2:63(3:11); R
2 = 0:42:
When dropping Bolivia and Sri Lanka that are large outliers, the results change to:
¢HI
Compo:eff:
Between = 0:30(0:03)¢HI + 4:24(1:03); R
2 = 0:75:
The intercepts are always small, even when statistically di®erent from zero. The slopes are
statistically positive and economically signi¯cant: they indicate that the shift of production
between HO-aggregates contributes to approximately one third of the evolution of industrial
concentration.
3.3 Does the Rybczynski e®ect explain the change in shares?
A Rybczynski e®ect should mainly lead to a between-aggregate change. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed in Section 2, this is not the only factor that can lead to a between-aggregate change. In
the textbook model with free and costless trade, the production of each HO aggregate is also
determined by the relative price of the aggregates, and by the technology used to produce each
aggregate. When the relative price of an aggregate increases, the relative value of its produc-
tion increases. When technological progress is more signi¯cant for a given aggregate, the same
phenomenon should be observed. In our framework, it turns out that the last two e®ects are
empirically equivalent. It is important to isolate the Rybczynski e®ect from these other e®ects.
It turns out that the Rybczynski e®ect is by far the most important factor explaining the
evolution of industrial specialization across HO aggregates. To show that, we compute an
estimate of the value-added per worker in country n that would have been observed without































na;a = l;k: (10)













































Figure 17: Changes in the share of the labor-intensive HO aggregate, actual, attributed to HO
factors, and attributed to the Rybczynski e®ect, 1975-1985.

















Figures 17-18 show that the Rybczynski e®ect is indeed important in explaining changes in
specialization at the HO aggregate level: for many countries, the change in the share of the
¯rst HO aggregate (found as explained in (8) and (9)) is close to the observed changes, both
for the 1975-1985 period and the 1985-1995 period (i.e. close to the 45-degree line). For 1985,
we tend to slightly overestimate the share of the labor-intensive aggregate: one explanation is
that its relative price went down during the period. By taking this change into account, the
change estimated based on the neoclassical factors is closer to the actual one. This is rather the
opposite for the 1985-1995 period: in that case, the relative price of the labor-intensive goods
went down, and the estimated share in 1995 is higher when using all the neoclassical factors.
Nevertheless, those results indicate that, among the neoclassical factors, the Rybczynski e®ect
is hugely dominant. It is therefore changes in the countries capital-labor ratios that explain
most of the switch of production from one HO aggregate to the other one.
Focusing on 14 developing countries over the 1982-1992 period, Xu (2003) runs Rybczyn-
ski regressions at the industry level. He ¯nds that developing countries tend to specialize in
labor-intensive goods when they accumulate capital. Even if we ¯nd this to be true for a few
initially poor countries (like Chile between 1985 and 1995), our results con¯rm that, on aver-













































Figure 18: Changes in the share of the labor-intensive HO aggregate, actual, attributed to HO
factors, and attributed to the Rybczynski e®ect, 1985-1995.
a di®erence? First, we measure the capital/labor ratio in the manufacturing sector while Xu
takes the national one. For Colombia and Egypt, we ¯nd a decrease in K=L from 1985 to 1995,
while Xu ¯nds the opposite. Second, he studies the 1982-1992 period: our results indicate that
the Rybczynski e®ect has been stronger in the 1975-1985 period than in the 1985-1995 period.
Third, ranking industries according to their average capital-intensity in the 1982-1992 period
cannot take into account important changes in factor intensity, whereas we allow industries to
move across aggregates. And ¯nally, running regressions at the industry level might hide the
fact that, on average, the overall share of the capital-intensive goods went up, something we
measure by constructing HO aggregates.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we make contributions in two directions. First, we build on Schott (2003) to
develop a more complete test of the production side of the HO model. Special attention is given
to intra-industry heterogeneity in factors of production and to the potentially indeterminate
nature of production. Using data for 51 countries during the period 1975-1995, we ¯nd that
countries do produce as predicted by the model. By comparing our estimates for the di®erent
years, we can study the actual development path of each country.
Second, we argue that the HO model provides possible explanations for the two stages of
development documented by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003): the U-curve for industrial concentra-
tion may be the direct result of capital accumulation (Rybczynski e®ect), and can also be due
37to changes in relative prices (which involve both demand and supply) or to a biased techno-
logical progress. We develop a methodology to measure the contribution of those neoclassical
factors. We ¯nd that these factors, and mainly capital accumulation, explain roughly 30% of
the evolution of industrial concentration: in our opinion, this is not bad for an explanation not
mentioned in the seminal paper!
Our decomposition of the evolution of industrial concentration also indicates that a large
part of that evolution remains unexplained by the standard neoclassical factors: specialization
with economies of scale, risk diversi¯cation and maybe other forces27 are also part of the story.
In this paper, we propose a ¯rst measure of the total contribution of these non-neoclassical
elements. Their respective contributions remain to be determined.
This work shows that observed production patterns are consistent with the simplest HO
model. But there is a large discrepancy between the model and reality. The most important
di®erence is that our economies produce more than two goods and that these goods are widely
heterogenous in their capital-labor ratios. This simple fact makes the simple algebra of the HO
model very messy, and the nice production patterns of the textbook model seem to disappear.
So, as Schott (2003) and our paper have shown, the HO model is a very useful model to study
production patterns, but one must ask why it works so well. As far as we know, there is yet no
de¯nite answer to this question.
On the economic policy front, our theoretical framework and empirical results suggest a
possibly large bene¯t of investment-based growth strategies. When developing countries ac-
cumulate capital, specialization µ a la Heckscher-Ohlin based on market incentives should au-
tomatically lead to a more diversi¯ed industrial structure: investment-based growth causes
diversi¯cation.
27See Koren and Tenreyro (2005) for one of these.
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Figure 19: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, manufacturing level.
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6 Appendix
Figures 19-21 show our estimates for 1990 in order to allow a comparison with the results
obtained by Schott (2001, 2003). 1990 is also (with 1985) the year for which we get the highest
number of observations. Constrained least squares were used to estimate the parameters.
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43Figure 21: Capital-labor ratio and value-added per worker, capital-intensive aggregate.
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